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RETURNED TO THE PEDESTAL-THE
SUPREME COURT AND GENDER
CLASSIFICATION CASES: 1980 TERM
ARNOLD H. LoEwYt
During the previous decade the Supreme Court rarely upheld gen-
der-based classofcations, holding that in general women were entitled to
the same rights and duties as men. Two decisionsfrom the Court's most
recent term, Michael M. v. Superior Court and Rotsker v. Goldberg.
appear to have reversed this trend. In Michael M. the Court upheld a
statutory rape law thatpurported toprotect women but not men. Rot-
sker sustained Congress' exemption of women from registration for the
military draft. In this Article Professor Loewy examines these decisions
in light of the discriminatory effect such 'rotective" legislation may
have. Professor Loewy argues that both Michael M. and Rotsker have
seriously impaired the move towards equal citizenship for women.
Prior to 1970, a rough summary of the Supreme Court's treatment of wo-
men was that their time should be divided between the home and the pedes-
tal.1 The 1970s brought a series of decisions from which one could deduce
that the right of equal citizenship 2 or personhood could not be denied on the
basis of gender unless that denial was substantially related to an important
governmental objective.3 Indeed, no decision during this decade upheld a
classification that on its face discriminated against women,4 and those that
upheld discrimination against men appeared to be transient and compensa-
tory.5 Consequently, many of us who preferred personhood to pedestals for
women thought that the Equal Rights Amendment,6 while a desirable state-
ment of principle for the nation's fundamental charter, was hardly necessary
to reach this goal.
Now that the Court has empowered legislatures to deny a young woman
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; B.S., 1961; J.D., 1963,
Boston University, L.L.M., 1964, Harvard University. The author would like to thank George
Barsness, a third-year law student at the University of Texas School of Law, whose research and
healthy skepticism served to improve this Article.
1. See text accompanying notes 9-18 infra.
2. The phrase is Professor Karst's. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Forward:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1977).
3. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
4. See text accompanying notes 19-55 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 28-33 infra.
6. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment reads as follows:
§1. Equality of rights under the laws shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.
§2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
§3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
U.S. Const. amend. XXVIL proposed (March 27, 1972).
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the power to consent to sexual intercourse until she is substantially older than
the age at which her brother could consent7 and has empowered Congress to
exempt women while registering men for the military draft,8 the E.R.A. may
indeed be a woman's only escape from the pedestal to personhood.
PRE-1970
Although many pre-1970 cases rejected claims for gender equality,9 none
illustrate the Court's view of womanhood as something different from per-
sonhood better than Bradwell v. Illinois,l0 Goesaert v. Cleary," and Hoyt v.
Florida.'2 Bradwell rejected a married woman's claim that the privileges and
immunities clause entitled her to practice law on the same basis as a man.13
Concurring, Justice Bradley (joined by Justices Field and Swayne), spoke of
the role of women in no uncertain terms:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the do-
mestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.
... In the nature of things it is not every citizen of every age,
sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and position. It
is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded
on nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified
persons to professions and callings demanding special skill and confi-
dence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the State; and, in
my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny and mis-
sion of woman, it is within the province of the Legislature to ordain
what offices, positions and callings shall be filled and discharged by
men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and responsibili-
ties, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to
predominate in the sterner sex.14
In Goesaert the Court upheld a statute allowing wives and daughters of
male bar owners to serve as barmaids while denying that privilege to all other
females including afemale bar owner and her daughter. In its opinion, the
Court rather casually commented:
7. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
8. See Rotsker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
9. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding statute limiting women's
work day to ten hours); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that four-
teenth amendment does not grant women the right to vote),
10. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
11. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
12. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
13. Plaintiff relied on the privileges and immunities clause rather than the equal protection
clause.
14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working
behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and
legal position of women. The fact that women may now have
achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives
and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not pre-
clude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, cer-
tainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic. . . .The
Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological in-
sight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards.15
It then employed the following reasoning to uphold the classification:
Since bartending- by women may, in the allowable legislative judg-
ment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may
devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full
length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of fe-
males other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce
the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition.
Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through own-
ership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards
that may confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight.
... Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in reason,
we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this
legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to
monopolize the calling.16
Hoyt upheld the conviction of a woman for the murder of her husband
returned by an all male jury from which a woman's opportunity to serve was
systematically diminished. The Court described the system and justification
for it:
In the selection of jurors Florida has differentiated between men
and women in two respects. It has given women an absolute exemp-
tion from jury duty based solely on their sex, no similar exemption
obtaining as to men. And it has provided for its effectuation in a
manner less onerous than that governing exemptions exercisable by
men: women are not to be put on the jury list unless they have vol-
untarily registered for such service; men, on the other hand, even if
entitled to an exemption, are to be included on the list unless they
have filed a written claim of exemption as provided by law.
In neither respect can we conclude that Florida's statute is not
'based on some reasonable classification,' and that it is thus infected
with unconstitutionality. Despite the enlightened emancipation of
women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and
their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to
be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissi-
ble for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude
15. 335 U.S. at 465-66.
16. Id. at 466-67.
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that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service
unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her
own special responsibilities.' 7
Thus, as late as the 1960s, the Court's view of the woman as a homebody
was sufficient to render the duty of citizenship, which was obligatory for men,
something that a woman could accept or reject according to her fancy. The
irony of this was that a woman, who was presumably one of the recipients of
all this special legislative and judicial concern, could be convicted by an all
male jury of murdering her husband during a domestic quarrel.' 8
THE 1970s
The Supreme Court's version of the sexual revolution of the seventies be-
gan inauspiciously enough with Reed v. Reed,'9 a case challenging an Idaho
law that preferred men over women as administrators of estates when the con-
testants were equally related to the decedent.20 Though invalidating the law,
the Court did not explicitly hold that special scrutiny was appropriate for gen-
der classification. Yet, the opinion did contain harbingers of things to come.
First, while citing several cases for the proposition that "the Fourteenth
Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of
persons in different ways," 2' it cited neither Bradwell, Goesaert, Hoyt, nor any
other case upholding a gender classification. Second, the Court employed
some long disused language from the interventionist days of the 1920s to in-
validate the statute:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike."'22
Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the statute was rational
because it eliminated disputes. In its rejection, the Court hinted that gender-
based classifications might require special scrutiny.23 Idaho was undoubtedly
correct in concluding that any method of resolving disputes of this nature
without a hearing, such as choosing the older, the younger, the male, or the
female would render a hearing unnecessary, thereby saving judicial time and
minimizing intrafamilial squabbles. Furthermore, Idaho was probably safe in
17. 368 U.S. at 61.
18. Not only was the Hoyt jury all male, but under the Florida system the odds were that
most juries would be all male.
19. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
20. Law of Feb. 1, 1864, ch. 3, § 52, 1863 Idaho Sess. Laws 335 (repealed 1971).
21. 404 U.S. at 75. The cases cited were McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802 (1969); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
22. 404 U.S. at 76, (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). See
also Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral,
and Permissive Classifications, 62 Gee. LJ. 1071 (1974).
23. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
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assuming that men as a group, because of their having been exposed to busi-
ness and/or law in greater numbers,24 were more likely to be qualified to ad-
minister estates than women as a group. Rejecting this argument, the Court
opined:
Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate courts
by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legitimacy.
The crucial question, however, is whether § 15-314 advances that ob-
jective in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. We hold that it does not. To give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding in-
trafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be
mandated solely on the basis of sex.25
During the next term, in Frontiero v. Richardson,26 four Justices (Bren-
nan, Douglas, White, and Marshall) read this language to support the conclu-
sion that sex is a suspect classification. Three other Justices (Powell, Burger,
and Blackmun) refused to so hold, but did invalidate the gender discrimina-
tion at issue-automatic dependency allowance for male but not female mili-
tary officers-on the authority of Reed.27
The next three cases appeared to reject the claim for gender equality.
Two of them, Kahn v. Shevin28 and Schlesinger v. Ballard,29 upheld compensa-
tory discrimination in favor of females. Kahn upheld a property tax exemp-
tion for widows, but not widowers, reasoning that "[t]here can be no dispute
that the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any
other state exceed those facing the man."' 30 Ballard sustained a federal statute
that required discharge of a male naval officer who was twice denied promo-
tion, thereby effectively mandating his discharge after nine years even though
a female officer could not be discharged for thirteen years.3 1 The Court
24. According to the United States Census of 1970, there were 248,643 male lawyers and
12,508 female lawyers. That Census additionally lists 5,385,603 male non-farm managers or ad-
ministrators and 1,077,468 female non-farm managers or administrators. U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 1, Characteristics of the Population 718-19 (1973).
25. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
26. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
27. Id. at 691. Justice Stewart concurred separately. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
28. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
29. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
30. 416 U.S. at 353.
31. (a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in the grade of lieutenant
except an officer in the Nurse Corps, and each officer on the active list of the Marine
Corps serving in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the
fiscal year in which he is considered as having failed of selection for promotion to the
grade of lieutenant commander or major for the second time. However, ifhe so requests,
he may be honorably discharged at any time during that fiscal year.
(d) This section does not apply to women officers appointed under section 5590 of
this title or to officers designated for limited duty.
1981]
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thought that an earlier up or out time for a man was reasonable because he
had more opportunities for promotion than a woman. When men and women
were similarly situated (e.g., Judge Advocates Corp., Medical Services Corp.
and Nurse's Corp.), the up or out time was identical.32 Consequently, neither
Kahn nor Ballard need be viewed as a serious retrenchment of the gender
equality principle.33
The third case, Geduldig v. Aiello,34 involved a California disability pro-
gram that excluded normal pregnancy from its coverage.35 Concluding that
the pregnancy exclusion was not gender based, the Court, including Justice
White who had previously declared gender to be a suspect classification, had
little difficulty sustaining the exclusion. While the correctness of this result is
not so clear as the Court's rather cavalier treatment of the issue would sug-
gest,36 there is something to be said for eliminating some disabilities in order
to minimize the cost to employees. Indeed, in view of the fact that even with-
out pregnancy coverage, women were receiving proportionately more disabil-
ity payments than they had contributed, 37 it is possible that including
pregnancy would have justified California's charging women a higher pre-
mium than men for their disability coverage.3s Obviously some women would
10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976).
(a) Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed under section 5590 of
this title, who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of lieutenant and each wo-
man officer on the active list of the Marine Corps who holds a permanent appointment in
the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in
which-
(1) she is not on a promotion list, and
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned service in the Navy or in
the Marine Corps.
However, if she so requests, she may be honorably discharged at any time during that
fiscal year.
Id. § 6401.
32. 419 U.S. at 509.
33. This is more clearly true of Ballard than Kahn since all women had less opportunity for
promotion than those men who were subject to an earlier discharge. In Kahn, there were un-
doubtedly some widowed men whose financial difficulties exceeded those of some widowed wo-
men. Nevertheless, compensatory legislation, even if somewhat stereotypical, threatens the
principle of gender equality less seriously than legislation that relegates women to second class
citizenship. But see Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31
Hast. L. Rev. 1379 (1980). The Court must, however, take care to invalidate legislation that on the
surface appears to protect women, but in fact demeans them. See text accompanying notes 75-85
infra.
34. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
35. When this suit was originally fied, disabilities resulting from abnormal as well as normal
pregnancies were excluded. In Rentzer v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604,
108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973), the California Court of Appeal held that disabilities resulting from
abnormal pregnancies were covered. Thus, at the Supreme Court level, the case only involved
exclusion for disabilities arising from normal pregnancies.
36. The Court's entire analysis of the issue was contained in a single footnote. See 417 U.S.
at 496-97 n.20.
37. Women contributed 28% of the fund and received 38% of the benefits. Id. at 497 n.21.
38. This assumes that actuarial experience can be considered when it results in a premium
differential based on gender. But cf. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Lay-
cock and Sullivan, Sex Discrimination As "Actuarial Equality": A Rejoinder to Kimball, 1981
Am. Bar Foundation Research J. 221. Even if it could not, insuring an additional risk could result
in a higher premium for both men and women.
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prefer to pay a lower premium than have pregnancy coverage. Thus, while
Geduldig was hardly a shot in the arm for those seeking to end gender discrim-
ination, it was not a significant setback.
For the remainder of the Seventies, the Court's commitment to sexual
equality wavered very little.39 Two 1975 cases, Taylor v. Louisiana4° and Stan-
ton v. Stanton,41 drained Hoyt, Goesaert, and Bradwell42 of whatever vitality
they may have retained theretofore.
Taylor not only rejected Hoyt's underlying premise, but did so on facts
that were not nearly so compelling. Unlike Hoyt, where an all male jury may
well have been unsympathetic to the defendant's claim, Taylor involved a
male defendant and a female victim. Nevertheless, the Court held that all
defendants are entitled to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity and that this.right was breached when women were systematically under-
represented. 43 In response to Louisiana's argument that women serve a
distinctive role in society, the Court concluded:
The States are free to grant exemptions from jury service to indi-
viduals in case of special hardship or incapacity and to those engaged
in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is
critical to the community's welfare. It would not appear that such
exemptions would pose substantial threats that the remaining pool of
jurors would not be representative of the community. A system ex-
cluding all women, however, is a wholly different matter. It is unten-
able to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each
and every woman to perform jury service or that society cannot spare
any women from their present duties. This may be the case with
many, and it may be burdensome to sort out those who should be
exempted from those who should serve. But that task is performed in
the case of men, and the administrative convenience in dealing with
women as a class is insufficient justification for diluting the quality of
community judgment represented by the jury in criminal trials. 44
Stanton invalidated a Utah requirement that a father support his son until
age twenty-one, but his daughter only until age eighteen.45 The Utah
Supreme Court had justified this dichotomy on the ground that "it is a salu-
tary thing for [a male] to get a good education and/or training before he un-
39. With three arguable exceptions: 1) compensatory female-favoring legislation, e.g.,
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); 2) relationship to illegitimate children [a category, suffi-
ciently sui generis that I have chosen to exclude it from the article], e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347 (1979); and 3) facially neutral legislation which has a disproportionately negative impact
on women, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding a veteran's preference for
state employment, which in operation favored males since there were more male than female
veterans).
40. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
41. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
42. See text accompanying notes 9-18 supra.
43. The Louisiana system was substantially identical to that upheld in Hoyt. See text accom-
panying note 17 supra.
44. 419 U.S. at 534-35.
45. 421 U.S. at 14-15.
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dertakes [the responsibility of providing a home for his family]. '' 46 In
forthrightly denouncing this justification, the Court said:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing
of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of
ideas. Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and ex-
panding. Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women
in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all
walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary,
antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice. If a
specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure
him parental support while he attains his education and training, so,
too, is it for the girl. To distinguish between the two on educational
grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so
long as the male, she hardly canbe expected to attend school as long
as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides
with the role-typing society has long imposed.47
Most assuredly, Bradwell's "women have no right to be attorneys" ration-
ale could not withstand the force of Stanton's logic. Probably Goesaert's "wo-
men have no right to be barmaids" logic was gone also. In any event, that case
was specifically rejected by Craig v. Boren,48 a case that invalidated an
Oklahoma sex/age classification, allowing women to purchase 3.2% beer at
age eighteen, but forbidding men from doing so until age twenty-one.
In some ways, Craig may be the most far reaching of the gender classifi-
cation cases. It was the first case to announce "that classification by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives."'49 Although purporting to apply es-
tablished principles rather than plow new ground,50 the first official Supreme
Court recognition of heightened scrutiny for gender classification is of consid-
erable significance.
Furthermore, unlike the typical gender classification case, Craig did not
involve a particularly invidious form of discrimination. The legislation was
directed against males, who are in no sense a "discreet and insular minor-
ity."'51 More importantly, statistics indicated that young men were far more
likely than young women to both drive while drunk and appear in public
while drunk.52 Thus when Oklahoma revised its age of majority laws to elimi-
nate sex/age classifications, 53 it is not surprising that it chose to retain the
46. 30 Utah 2d 315, 318-19, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974).
47. 421 U.S. at 14-15.
48. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
49. Id. at 197.
50. The Court stated that "previous cases establish [this standard]." Id.
51. Obviously, the phrase is Justice Stone's. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938). See Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57
N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1978). But cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
52. For a summary of the statistics offered by the State of Oklahoma, see Walker v. Hall, 399
F. Supp. 1304, 1314-21 (W.D. Okla. 1975). See also 429 U.S. at 200 n.8.
53. The revisions were made pursuant to a federal court order. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18
(10th Cir. 1972).
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discrepancy in the age for purchasing beer.54 The willingness of the Court to
invalidate even so inoffensive a gender classification as this one surely sug-
gested that few such classifications would be sustained.55
1980 TERM
Of the three gender classification cases decided during the 1980 term, only
the least significant, Kirchberg v. Feenstra,56 invalidated the classification.
Kirchberg involved a Louisiana law (since repealed) that empowered a hus-
band, and only a husband, to alienate community property jointly owned by
him and his wife. The invalidated statute provided:
The husband is the head and master of the partnership or com-
munity of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues
which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, with-
out the consent and permission of his wife.57
Since this provision was clearly more invidious than Reed v. Reed or any other
case from the seventies, its invalidation was a foregone conclusion. Indeed, it
was one of the few gender classification statutes to be unanimously
invalidated.
The other two cases, Rotsker v. Goldberg5s and Michael M. v. Superior
Court,59 upheld respectively a male-only draft registration and a statutory
rape law under which only males could be perpetrators and only females
could be victims. The remainder of this article will explore the extent to which
these two decisions have departed from the precedent of the seventies and
have indeed returned women to the pedestal, stripped of much of their
personhood.
On the surface, the highly publicized Rotsker case appears to favor wo-
men-allowing them to volunteer for the military or not as they so choose,
while subjecting men to involuntary registration and perhaps involuntary ser-
vitude in the military. This facile conclusion vanishes when one asks why
males are subjected to this burden. The answer that our government gives the
recalcitrant young man is: "It is your duty as a United States citizen." The
message to young women is: "Your citizenship duty is optional, while your
brother's (the real citizen) is mandatory." The analogy to the jury system, first
upheld in Hoyt v. Florida, and later invalidated in Taylor v. Louisiana, is
54. I do not.suggest that the statistics compel this sex/age differential, only that they make it
appear noninvidious. See Loewy, supra note 51, at 16-17.
55. Another noteworthy case from the seventies, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), invalidated
Alabama's law granting alimony only to women. Refusing to justify the statute on the ground
that it was designed to compensate women for past discrimination, the Court held that since indi-
vidual hearings were always necessary to determine eligibility for alimony, Alabama was not justi-
fied in using gender as a proxy for either need or past discrimination.
56. 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981).
57. Id. at 1197 n.l (quoting La. Civ. Code art. 2373 (1825) (recodified at La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 2404 (West 1971)) (repealed 1978)).
58. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
59. 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
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apparent.60
Even second class citizenship might be constitutionally tolerable (at least
according to prior decisions) if that status were substantially related to an im-
portant governmental objective.61 Were there proof that the registration of
women precluded the smooth functioning of the military, that standard proba-
bly would have been met. Not only was such proof not adduced, but all of the
military leaders testified that women contributed positively to the military.62
Indeed, these leaders, along with President Carter, advocated the inclusion of
women in the registration.63 Why then, did the Court sustain this
classification?
Perhaps the hallmark of Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court is its
extraordinary deference towards Congress. Apart from the fact that the Court
in general, and Rehnquist in particular, have not always been so deferential, 64
one would have thought that prior decisions mandated governmental proof
that the classification was substantially related to an important objective. Yet
the Court, while explicitly refusing to accord to congressional military legisla-
tion "any further 'refinement' in the applicable [equal protection] tests,"'65 did
uphold this classification largely on the ground that Congress enacted it.
Had Congress, contrary to the President and military leaders, determined
that registering women was seriously detrimental to the military, the Court's
decision to defer to Congress would have at least been relevant to its judgment
of constitutionality. In fact, Congress made no such determination. Rather,
Congress simply determined that there was no military necessity to draft
women.
Drafting women is arguably less necessary than drafting men because wo-
men are ineligible to serve in combat positions. Accepting this, at least argu-
endo, it would seem clear that more men than women should be drafted.
Indeed, if all members of the military were required to be combat eligible, no
woman would be drafted or, for that matter, accepted as a volunteer. Of
course, not all members of the military have to be combat eligible. Women
volunteers have been accepted for years,66 and under prior drafts, male consci-
60. See text accompanying notes 17-18 and 40-44 supra.
61. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. at 2650.
62. In summarizing the testimony presented at the congressional hearings, Senator Cohen
stated:
fB]asically the evidence has come before this committee that participation of women in
the All-Volunteer Force has worked well, has been praised by every military officer who
has testified before the committee, and that the jobs are being performed with the same,
if not in some cases, with superior skill.
Id. at 2665 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Department of Defense Authorization for Ap-
propriations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1678 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Cohen), [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on S. 2294]).
63. The President had sought an allocation of funds to register both men and women. Con-
gress allocated funds to register males only. 101 S. Ct. at 2655.
64. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
65. 101 S. CL. at 2654. The Court purported to reject the government's argument that the
rational basis test was more appropriate. Id.
66. As is apparent from such cases as Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and
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entious objectors were required to perform noncombat duties.67 In fact, the
military testimony indicated that in a draft of 650,000 persons, 80,000 women
could be absorbed to perform noncombat duties. 68
More importantly, there was absolutely no evidence that it would have
been harmful for the military to register, as opposed to draft, women. Indeed,
whether vital or not, it is surely helpful to know how many women as well as
men are available to be drafted, should an emergency break out. Obviously,
registering men and women would cost more than just registering men,69 but
cost, like administrative convenience, is not enough to justify a gender classifi-
cation-even in the military.
70
Because Justice Marshall's dissent so thoroughly exposes the Court's
analytical flaws, further dissection seems a bit like the proverbial beating of a
dead horse. Yet one cannot help but be disturbed by the Court's willingness to
accept needless congressional discrimination in this area. Indeed, one senses
that gender stereotyping and discrimination is not a dead horse, but rather is a
horse that won't die no matter how thoroughly beaten.
Disturbing as it is, Rotsker may not have as lasting or as brutal an impact
on the drive for gender equality as Michael M At least Rotsker involved the
military, which is somewhat sacrosanct and at times sui generis.71 Further, it
did involve a congressional judgment, however ill-advised. Michael M, on
the other hand, upheld a blatantly sexist California statutory rape statute,
which had been rejected by thirty-seven other state legislatures. 72
The statute punished sexual intercourse with a female under the age of
eighteen.73 No comparable statute punished sexual intercourse with a male
under eighteen.74 Indeed, Michael M. was such a male.
The plurality's willingness to uphold Michael M.'s indictment rested
largely on the following observations:
Underlying [Reed v. Reed and Craig v. Boren] is the principle that
the legislature may not "make overbroad generalizations based on
sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and
women or which demean the ability or social status of the affected
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 26-27 supra and
31-32 supra, respectively. See 10 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
67. Except where their conscientious objections extended to all forms of military service. 50
U.S.C. App. § 456j) (1976).
68. 101 S. Ct. at 2659 (citing Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 62, at 1661, 1828).
69. The President had requested $8,500,000 to cover the cost of registering females. 101 S.
Ct. at 2655 (citing S. Rep. No. 789, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980)).
70. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richarson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
71. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
72. 101 S. Ct. at 1216 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. "Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of
the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (West
Supp. 1981).
74. Although there were other statutes which punished various forms of sexual activity with
minors. 101 S. Ct. at 1208 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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class." 75
In upholding the California statute we also recognize that this is
not a case where a statute is being challenged on the grounds that it
"invidiously discriminates" against females. To the contrary, the
statute places a burden on males which is not shared by females. But
we find nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination
or peculiar disadvantages, are in need or the special solicitude of the
courts. Nor is this a case where the gender classification. . . rests on
"the baggage of sexual stereotypes".. .. 76
Obviously, the plurality viewed the challenged statute as one discriminat-
ing against males. In a certain and very obvious sense, it does. Michael M.
may become a felon and suffer substantial imprisonment because he had the
misfortune to be born a boy, while Sharon, his willing partner,77 remains free
to press charges and perhaps become somebody else's voluntary "victim."
In a more global sense, however, the statute demeans all of California's
young women by forbidding their sexual experimentation 78 while allowing
their younger brothers to experiment whenever they can find a willing older
woman. These young women are protected only in the sense that Goesaert
was protected from the evils of bartending in Goesaert v. Cleary.79 The reason
California's statute does not seem as invidious as Michigan's barmaid statute
is that it has been so sporadically enforced that it has not in fact precluded
young women from being sexually active. Thus, it is only because of its inef-
fectiveness that the statute appears to discriminate against boys like Michael
M. who are occasionally prosecuted, rather than girls like Sharon, who theo-
retically are not, but practically are, able to engage in sexual intercourse. Yet
whatever else might be said about sporadic enforcement,80 it is hardly an ar-
gument for sustaining that which would otherwise constitute an invidious
discrimination.
As a general proposition, I do not quarrel with the plurality's willingness
to uphold noninvidious classifications, particularly against males. Indeed, as
suggested earlier, had the Court upheld the sex/age classification for purchas-
75. Id. at 1204 (Rehnquist, J., writing for a plurality) (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347, 354 (1979)).
76. Id. at 1207-08.
77. Factually there is some question regarding the degree of Sharon's willingness. Although
she voluntarily kissed and hugged both the defendant and one of his friends, she claims that she
did not consent to intercourse until he hit her. Id. at 1203 (Rehnquist, J., writing for a plurality),
1212 (Stewart, J., concurring). The crime, however, is predicated on the assumption that the par-
ties voluntarily copulated. See Cal. Penal Code § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981). Thus, his lack of force
or her eagerness would be no defense.
78. An activity that is arguably entitled to independent constitutional protection. Cf. Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (upholding distribution of contraceptives to per-
sons under 16 years of age); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (upholding distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons).
79. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Discussed at text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
80. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute which made con-
traceptives unlawful had been sporadically enforced).
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ing 3.2% beer in Oklahoma, no great harm would have been done.8 ' Michael
M, however, illustrates that it is extremely easy to trip over a sexual stereo-
type without ever recognizing it. One reason for this is that burdens are often
imposed upon men because of the perceived inferiority (or, if you prefer, deli-
cacy) of the "fair sex." The classic example from English literature is Charles
Dickens' Mr. Bumble who raised the defense that it was his wife and not he
who had committed the crime, only to learn that if she had committed the
crime in his presence that he was the more guilty because "the law supposes
that you wife acts under you direction." Mr. Bumble responded: "If the law
supposes that, the law is a ass-a idiot. If that's the eye of the law, the law's a
bachelor, and. . .I wish... that his eye might be opened by experience."8 2
Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere, "[If the law supposes that, it is worse
than an ass-it is an unconstitutional ass."8 3
Fortunately, the Court has not always been so insensitive to this subtle
form of denigration. In Orr v. Orr8 4 it recognized that alimony for women
only "distribute[s] benefits and burdens on the basis of gender [thereby]
carry[ing] the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper
place' of women and their need for special protection."8 5 Perhaps if the Court
had been aware of the invidious stereotyping inherent in the California statu-
tory rape law, it would have more closely scrutinized the justification proffered
for the statute.
The justification accepted by the Court, in Michael M., was California's
desire to prevent teenage pregnancies.8 6 Several difficulties inhere in this jus-
tification. The statute applies even when one or both of the parties use contra-
ceptives, are sterile, or even when the girl is already pregnant. Thus, an
eighteen year old boy who has had a vasectomy could be sent to the state's
prison for creating an unjustifiable risk of impregnating an already pregnant
seventeen year old girl.8 7 Upon informing the boy of this, one should not be
too surprised to learn that he has adopted Mr. Bumble's opinion of the law.
Even assuming this purpose, 88 it is not clear that it could not be equally or
better served by punishing both male and female participants. To be sure, the
plurality is correct in asserting that such a statute would deter young women
81. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra. See also Loewy, supra note 51, at 16-17.
82. C. Dickens, The Adventures of Oliver Twist (London 1837), quoted in Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199, 223-24 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. Loewy, supra note 51, at 9. Consider also the hypothetical suggested therein of a statute
that makes a white employer liable for all thefts committed by his black employees against third
persons. Although the white employer, like Michael M., would suffer under the discriminatory
statute, the vice of both statutes is that they assume that those stereotyped as inferior are incapable
of conducting themselves responsibly.
84. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). Discussed at note 55 supra.
85. Id. at 283.
86. 101 S. Ct. at 1205.
87. Justice Stewart suggests that recognizing no impregnating possibility as a defense would
encounter difficult problems of proof. Id. at 1210 n.10 (Stewart, J., concurring). This sort of
"administrative convenience," however, should never be permitted to justify such invidiously dis-
criminatory legislation.
88. Which it almost assuredly was not. See id. at 1217-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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from reporting the "crime" to police.89 However, for very good reason, the
crime is rarely reported anyway.90 Thus, it is at least arguable that the margi-
nal gain in deterring female violators would equal or exceed the marginal loss
in reported violations.91 After all, we are supposedly more concerned with
reducing pregnancies than obtaining convictions.
Beyond this, a state's interest in deterring teenage motherhood may not be
all that dramatically different from deterring teenage fatherhood. To be sure,
it will not be pleasant for a teenage mother to face the choice of abortion,
adoption, or eighteen years of motherhood, but at least she has the choice.
Consider the following two possible scenarios following the sexual encounter
between seventeen year old John and sixteen year old Mary:
I
Mary: I'm pregnant.
John: When will our baby be born.
Mary: It won't. I'm having an abortion.
John: Don't do that! I believe abortion is murder. Killing that
child will have a profound effect on me.
Mary: Too bad, I don't want to have a child. The Supreme Court
says I can abort if I want to. Your feelings are irrelevant. 92
or,
II
Mary: I'm pregnant.
John: Get an abortion. I'll scrape up the money to pay for it.
Mary: I don't want to.
John: Then give the child up for adoption.
Mary: No. I'm going to keep it, and raise it until it's eighteen.
John: Will I have to contribute to its support all those years even
though I don't want it?
Mary: Yes.
This is not meant to minimize the brutal impact that an unwanted pregnancy
can have on a teenage girl. It only suggests that the dichotomy between boys
and girls may not be so great as the Court suggests.
Finally, the "possibility" of pregnancy rationale has the potential for all
sorts of discrimination against women. For example, could women be prohib-
89. Id. at 1206-07. It would also deter them from blackmailing those boys whom they may
have enticed into sexual intercourse for that very purpose. I do not suggest that this happens with
great frequency and certainly do not suggest that females are more prone to engage in this sort of
conduct than males. Nevertheless, whenever the law provides punishment for only one of two
offenders to a voluntary transaction, it opens the door to blackmail possibilities.
90. A girl not desirous of blackmailing her lover is unlikely to report consensual intercourse
to the police. See id. at 1216 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. The burden is on California to show that its gender classification is substantially related
to its purpose. Justice Rehnquist seemed willing to defer to the California Supreme Court's deter-
mination that this gender classification met that standard. Id. at 1207 n.10. Under this reasoning
it is questionable whether any gender classification upheld by a state court which is clever enough
to incant the right words would be invalidated by the Supreme Court.
92. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-71 (1976).
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ited from working in a nuclear plant because of the possible risk to their ba-
bies should they get pregnant? What about an important government grant in
which the risk of pregnancy might render completion of the grant less expedi-
tious? 93 Although this type of "slippery slope" argument probably would not
justify refusing to take the first step when compelling reasons mandate it, here
the compelling reasons cut the other way.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to be sure whether Roisker and Michael M. have perma-
nently allowed women to be returned to the pedestal or merely slowed their
march towards full personhood. Both the majority in Rotsker and the plural-
ity in Michael M accorded extraordinary deference to the respective legisla-
tive bodies. Indeed, MichaelM referred to the California Legislature's recent
decision to remain one of the few states retaining a gender based statutory
rape law with an accolade worthy of Hoyt, Goesaert, or Bradwell: "Certainly
this decision of the California Legislature is as good a source as is this Court in
deciding what is 'current' and what is 'outmoded' in the perception of
women."
94
On the other hand, if the demeaning character of this discrimination re-
ally was not made apparent to the Court, maybe the Court quite simply did
not realize what it was doing.95 If so, one can hope that in future cases, a
majority of the Justices will return to women the equal citizenship accorded
them by the decisions of the seventies.
93. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (pregnant teachers cannot be
discharged early in their pregnancy without an individual determination that they are unfit to
serve), certainly does not resolve this question.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1205 n.6.
95. The Court necessarily includes Justice Blackmun's rather enigmatic concurring opinion,
which was necessary to make a majority. Blackmun describes this case as "an unattractive one to
prosecute" for the following reasons:
I think, too, that it is only fair, with respect to this particular petitioner, to point out that
his partner, Sharon, appears not to have been an unwilling participant in at least the
initial stages of the intimacies that took place the night of June 3, 1978. Petitioner's and
Sharon's nonacquaintance with each other before the incident; their drinking; their with-
drawal from the others of the group; their foreplay, in which she willingly participated
and seems to have encouraged; and the closeness of their ages (a difference of only one
year and 18 days) are factors that should make this case an unattractive one to prosecute
at all, and especially to prosecute as a felony, rather than as a misdemeanor chargeable
under § 261.5. But the State has chosen to prosecute in that manner, and the facts, I
reluctantly conclude, may fit the crime.
Id. at 1212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Yet it one seriously believes that the purpose of the
statute is to prevent teenage pregnancies rather than to protect sweet young maidens, this seems
like an ideal case to prosecute. Certainly the casual nature of the encounter would suggest the
unlikelihood of contraception.
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